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DIAGNOSING MEDICAL MONITORING COSTS UNDER
CERCLA: CHECKING FOR A PULSE
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, society has become increasingly concerned
with the health dangers posed by human exposure to hazardous
substances. The potential severity of diseases caused by hazardous
substances, coupled with prolonged latency periods, has burdened
many with "a continuing need for frequent testing for possible, re-
sultant disease."1 Individuals exposed to toxic waste hope that med-
ical monitoring will "expedite the early diagnosis of diseases
secondary to toxic exposure."2
Medical monitoring, however, is an expensive undertaking.
Consequently, individuals exposed to hazardous substances have at-
tempted to shift these surveillance costs to those responsible for the
pollution. The shifting of the burden from the victim to responsi-
ble parties, would have various results.3 First, a remedy including
medical monitoring costs would provide financial resources and
compensation to victims. 4 Second, it would deter environmental
irresponsibility. 5 Failure to award such costs to victims possessing
sufficient resources would cause innocent parties to bear the cost of
medical monitoring themselves; 6 moreover, in cases where injured
parties lack financial capacity, medical monitoring would become
an impossibility. 7
1. Allan Kanner, Medical Monitoring: State and Federal Perspectives, 2 TUL.
ENVTL. LJ. 1, 2 (1989).
2. Akim F. Czmus, Medical Monitoring of Toxic Torts, 13 TEMP. ENvTL. L. &
TECH. J. 35, 39 (1994).
3. Id. at 38. Medical monitoring, as a remedy, has three potential benefits.
Id. "First, the medical monitoring remedy provides financial resources that enable
victims to receive needed medical testing. Second, it deters businesses and corpo-
rations from acting irresponsibly. Third, the medical monitoring remedy compen-
sates victims for injuries sustained and ameliorates the harm which they must
endure." Id. (citing Allan Kanner, Medical Monitoring Remedies, C855 ALI-ABA 737,
740-41 (1993)).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. (citing Leslie S. Gara, Comment, Medical Surveillance Damages: Using
Common Sense and the Common Law to Mitigate the Dangers Posed by Environmental
Hazards, 12 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 265, 265 (1988)).
7. Czmus, supra note 2, at 38.
(81)
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Traditionally, injured parties have sought to recover medical
monitoring costs through state common law tort actions. 8 Other
plaintiffs have sought to recover medical monitoring costs under
the statutory provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). 9
Plaintiffs in the latter category have argued that medical monitor-
ing costs are necessary "response costs" 10 under section 107 of CER-
CLA.11 Courts, however, have not uniformly decided the issue of
whether medical monitoring costs are recoverable under CERCLA.
Although two circuit courts have found such costs not recover-
able,12 several district courts have split on the subject.13 This Com-
ment traces the evolution of the recovery of medical monitoring
costs under CERCLA, addresses their current status, and offers a
prognosis for their future.
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
A. The History and Purpose of CERCLA
In response to mounting public outcry concerning improper
private hazardous waste disposal practices,14 Congress enacted CER-
8. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 785 (3d Cir. 1994),
cert. denied sub nom.; General Elec. Co. v. Ingram, 115 S. Ct. 1253 (1995) (holding
medical monitoring costs recoverable under Pennsylvania law); Ayers v. Jackson
Township, 525 A.2d 287, 311-12 (N.J. 1987) (holding expenses for medical surveil-
lance recoverable under New Jersey law).
9. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 §§ 101-405 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
10. CERCLA § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4). For a further discussion of
"response costs" under CERCLA, see infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
11. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
12. When a claim for medical monitoring costs under CERCLA was brought
before the Third Circuit, the court expressly declined to resolve this issue. Red-
land Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army of the United States, 55 F.3d 827
(3d Cir. 1995). According to the Redland court, because the "[p]laintiffs failed to
introduce sufficient evidence to survive a summary judgment motion on their
medical monitoring claim, we need not and do not address whether they could
recover medical monitoring costs from the United States as a 'response cost' under
CERCLA." Id. at 848 n.12.
For a discussion of the three circuit court cases that did address whether medi-
cal monitoring costs are recoverable as "response costs" under CERCLA, see infra
notes 122-133 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of district court cases finding medical monitoring costs
recoverable under CERCLA, see infra notes 73-100 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of district court cases finding medical monitoring costs not recoverable
under CERCLA, see infra notes 101-121 and accompanying text.
14. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-23. Potential environmental hazards such as those en-
[Vol. VII: p. 81
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CLA, 15 a statute with a retrospective and remedial purpose and
framework.16 CERCLA's bifurcated objective aims to effectuate the
expeditious response and cleanup of hazardous substance release
sites, while placing "ultimate financial responsibility for the cleanup
on those responsible for the waste."' 7 In order to avoid the poten-
tial conflict between CERCLA's separate objectives, Congress cre-
ated the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund (Superfund).18
In accordance with Superfund, CERCLA cleanup actions can be
carried out in one of three ways: 1) the government may allow,
under some circumstances, a responsible party to conduct its own
cleanup action under government supervision; 19 2) the govern-
ment may charge the responsible party for the costs associated with
the cleanup action as conducted by the government;20 or 3) in
cases where the identity of the responsible party is not known prior
to government action, the government may conduct cleanup ef-
forts, using moneys provided by the Superfund.2 1
countered at Love Canal in New York and at the Valley of the Drums in Kentucky
caught the attention of the public and, thereafter, Congress. Id.
15. CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. CERCLA was passed in an
effort "to bring order to the array of partly redundant, partly inadequate federal
hazardous substances cleanup and compensation laws." New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting FREDERICK ANDERSON ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL PRoTEcTION: LAw AND PoLIcY 568 (1984)).
16. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1079 (D. Colo. 1985).
17. Kathryn E. Hand, Comment, Someone to Watch Over Me: Medical Monitoring
Costs Under CERCLA, 21 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 363, 367 (1994). CERCLA applies
"primarily to the cleanup of leaking inactive and abandoned sites and to emer-
gency responses to spills." Anderson, supra note 15, at 568. In addition, courts
have held that CERCLA is to be given a broad and liberal construction. United
States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898 (D.N.H. 1985).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (repealed 1987), recodified in 26 U.S.C. § 9507.
Superfund was formed as a result of "the conflict between the urgency of cleanup
needs and the time-consuming process of ascertaining the responsible parties."
Hand, supra note 17, at 367.
19. See CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
20. See id.
21. See Hand, supra note 17, at 367-68. The government may later bring suit
against potentially responsible parties to recover the costs it expended during
cleanup. See CERCIA § 107(a) (4) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (A).
1996]
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B. CERCLA Liability and Cost Recovery Actions
Under CERCLA's liability provision,2 2 "responsible persons"23
are held financially accountable in three situations.2 4 First, a re-
sponsible party will be liable to the government for Superfund
moneys expended while conducting "removal"2 5 or "remedial ac-
22. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a).
23. CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4). The term "respon-
sible persons" is used in this context to include:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel . . .or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility . . . owned or
operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous sub-
stances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, . . . or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which
causes the incurrence of response costs .
Id.
24. See CERCLA § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (4).
25. CERCLA defines "remove" or "removal" as:
the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the envi-
ronment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the
threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such ac-
tions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or
threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed mate-
rial, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent,
minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the
environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of re-
lease. The term includes, in addition, without being limited to, security
fencing or other measures to limit access, provision of alternate water
supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of threatened individuals
not otherwise provided for, action taken under section 9604(b) of this
title, and any emergency assistance which may be provided under the Dis-
aster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [42 U.S.C-A. § 5121 et seq.].
CERCIA § 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (footnote omitted). "Removal efforts"
generally concern short-term cleanup arrangements. New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985).
[Vol. VII: p. 81
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tion"26 in response to actual or threatened "release"2 7 of a "hazard-
ous substance" 28 at a "facility."2 9 Second, a responsible party will be
liable to any other person3 0 who has incurred necessary response
26. CERCLA defines "remedy" or "remedial action" as:
those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in
addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize
the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause
substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the
environment. The term includes, but is not limited to, such actions at the
location of the release as storage, confinement, perimeter protection us-
ing dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay cover, neutralization, cleanup of re-
leased hazardous substances and associated contaminated materials,
recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive wastes,
dredging or excavations, repair or replacement of leaking containers, col-
lection of leachate and runoff, onsite treatment or incineration, provision
of alternative water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably required to
assure that such actions protect the public health and welfare and the
environment. The term includes the costs of permanent relocation of
residents and businesses and community facilities where the President de-
termines that, alone or in combination with other measures, such reloca-
tion is more cost-effective than and environmentally preferable to the
transportation, storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition off-
site of hazardous substances, or may otherwise be necessary to protect the
public health or welfare; the term includes offsite transport and offsite
storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition of hazardous sub-
stances and associated contaminated materials.
CERCIA § 101 (24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). "Remedial actions" generally concern
long-term or permanent containment or disposal programs. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d
at 1040.
27. CERCLA defines "release" as any "spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or dispos-
ing into the environment .... CERCLA § 101 (22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
28. CERCLA defines "hazardous substance" as: "(A) any substance designated
pursuant to section 1321(b) (2) (A) of Title 33, (B) any element, compound, mix-
ture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C)
any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant
to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6921] . CER-
CIA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
29. CERCLA defines "facility" as:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (in-
cluding any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well,
pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, mo-
tor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a haz-
ardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or
otherwise come to be located; ....
CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
30. Section 107(a) (4) (B) serves as a basis for private cost recovery actions
under CERCIA. CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B). See Brewer
v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1178 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) ("[C]ourts have held almost
unanimously that section 9607(a) (1-4) (B) creates a private cause of action against
section 9607(a) responsible parties for the recovery of 'necessary costs of response
incurred... consistent with the National Contingency Plan.' ").
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costs consistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP).31 Fi-
nally, a responsible party will be liable for "damages for injury to,
destruction of, or loss of natural resources including the reasonable
costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from
such a release."3 2 This Comment focuses on the application of
CERCLA section 107(a) (4) (B) in the context of recovering medical
monitoring costs.
Although the terminology of section 107(a) (4) (B) appears
straightforward, judicial application of this section has proved
troublesome.33 Due to the haste with which CERCLA was enacted,
Congress drafted the statute replete with compromise which has
subsequently been described as being "marred by vague terminol-
ogy and deleted provisions."3 4 Furthermore, "the lack of a clear
legislative history [makes] interpretation of CERCLA's broadly
drafted provisions a difficult task for courts."3 5
Section 107(a) (4) (B) specifically states that responsible parties
"shall be liable for . . . any other necessary costs of response in-
curred by any other person consistent with the national contin-
gency plan."36 Therefore, a private party seeking recovery under
section 107(a) (4) (B) of CERCLA must meet three threshold re-
quirements: 1) the claimant must not be a potentially responsible
31. CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B). The National Con-
tingency Plan (NCP) empowers the President to set up a framework detailing pro-
cedures and standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances,
pollutants, and contaminants. CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605.
32. CERCLA § 10 7 (a) (4) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (4) (C).
33. See Price v. United States Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1015 n.10 (9th Cir. 1994).
In Price, the court acknowledged the diversity of judicial interpretation regarding
the term "response costs" as found in CERCLA. Id.
34. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp.
823, 838-39 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd inpart, rev'd inpart, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
"In 1980, while the Senate considered one early version of CERCLA, the
House considered and passed another." Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1039-40 (citing
H.R. REP. No. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY
OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY
AcT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND), at 391-463 (Comm. Print 1983)). The version passed by
both Houses, however, was a last minute compromise assembled in large part by
Senate leaders. Id. at 1040. "Although Congress considered the possibility of legis-
lation enabling private actions, both Houses rejected the inclusion of any provision
allowing recovery of private damages unrelated to cleanup efforts." Czmus, supra
note 2, at 49.
35. Brian S. McGaughan, Comment, "CERCLAing" the Field of Lender Liability:
Clarifying the Security Interest Exemption, 4 V.LL. ENVrL. LJ. 89, 92 & n.22 (1993)
(citing Douglas M. Garrou, The Potentially Responsible Trustee: Probable Target for
CERCLA Liability, 77 VA. L. REv. 113, 119 (1991)).
36. CERCLA § 107 (a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B). For a further discus-
sion of the NCP, see supra note 31 and infra note 39 and accompanying text.
[Vol. VII: p. 81
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party (PRP);37 2) the response costs must be necessary;38 and 3) the
costs must be consistent with the NCP.3 9
C. Medical Monitoring as a "Necessary Cost of Response"
The second threshold requirement associated with recovery
has been the subject of litigation'because CERCLA's drafters ne-
glected to define the phrase "necessary costs of response." 40 This
omission leaves open the possibility that medical monitoring costs
fall within the parameters of necessary CERCLA response costs. 41
Section 101(25) defines "response" as "remove, removal, remedy,
and remedial action .... ",42 Section 101(23), thereafter, defines
"remove" and "removal" as "cleanup or removal of released hazard-
ous substances from the environment,"43 while the terms "remedy"
and "remedial," as defined in section 101 (24), address "actions con-
sistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to
removal actions."" These definitions make no specific reference to
medical monitoring costs, yet "both subsections specifically include
monitoring conducted in the interests of [protecting] public health
and welfare in their lists of examples."45
The legislative history of section 107 does little to clarify the
ambiguous terminology.46 Discussing the compromise bill which
37. CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1)-(4). See Hand, supra
note 17, at 370.
38. CERCIA § 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B).
39. Id. Courts have turned this into a five-part test. For a discussion of this
test, see infra note 96. The NCP "is an EPA-promulgated series of regulations re-
garding aspects of hazardous waste cleanups and cleanup plans." Hand, supra note
17, at 364 n.7. The NCP "is basically a procedural document with few substantive
criteria ... [which] poses little problems for plaintiffs." Id. at 370. See CERCLA
§ 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605.
40. See CERCLA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601.
41. SeeJones v. Inmont, 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1429-30 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
42. CERCLA § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25).
43. CERCLA § 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). For a further discussion of
these terms, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
44. CERCLA § 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). For a discussion of these
terms, see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
45. Hand, supra note 17, at 369 (emphasis added). In pertinent part,
§ 101 (23) includes "such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evalu-
ate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of re-
moved material, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent,
minimize or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare." CERCLA § 101(23), 42
U.S.C. § 9601(23) (emphasis added). Similarly, § 101 (24) refers to "any monitor-
ing reasonably required to assure that such actions protect the public health and wel-
fare." CERCLA § 101 (24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (emphasis added).
46. See Coburn v. Sun Chem. Corp., No. CIVA.88-0120, 1988 WL 120739, at
*3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1988) ("The legislative history of CERCLA offers little gui-
dance into the definition of 'necessary costs of response.' ").
1996]
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was subsequently passed by Congress, Senator Randolph, one of the
legislation's co-sponsors, explained, "[w]e have deleted the Federal
cause of action for medical expenses .... ."47 These sentiments were
echoed by Senator Stafford, the bill's co-sponsor.48 Senator Mitch-
ell, in describing the legislation's deficiencies, lamented that the
bill "provides nothing for what is the most important part of the
problem: injury to people .... We are abandoning that principle
here today when the damage involved is to a person [as opposed to
compensation for damage to property] .-49 The remarks of these
Senators may have been aimed at the term "medical expenses" as
defined in previous unpassed legislation.50 If this is the case, these
Senators were not discussing costs associated with medical monitor-
47. 126 CoNG. REc. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980), reprinted in HELEN C.
NEEDHAM & MARK MENEFEE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, SUPERFUND: A
LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY, at 294 (1982) (quoting statement of Sen. Randolph).
48. 126 CONG. REc. S14,967 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980), reprinted in NEEDHAM &
MENEFEE, supra note 47, at 294 (statement of Sen. Stafford). The Senator further
elaborated, "[w]e eliminated all third party compensation from the fund, includ-
ing out-of-pocket medical expenses of victims of releases." Id. Similar comments
were espoused by Senators Culver and Williams, the latter of whom professed,
"[m]y most serious concern with the proposed legislation is the absence of a provi-
sion for the compensation of victims of chemical wastes for their out-of-pocket
medical expenses." 126 CONG. REc. S14,983 & S14,984 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980),
reprinted in NEEDHAM & MENEFEE, supra note 47, at 296 (statements of Sens. Culver
and Williams).
49. 126 CONG. REc. S14,973 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980), reprinted in NEEDHAM &
MENEFEE, supra note 47, at 294 (statement of Sen. Mitchell). Further, the Senator
stated, "[n]o longer can a victim of chemical poisoning seek from the fund out-of-
pocket medical expenses for an illness resulting from the action or inaction of
another party." Id. at 295. At this point, the Senator described the bill's impact in
the form of an analogy:
Under this bill, if a toxic waste discharge injures both a tree and a person,
the tree's owner, if it is a government, can promptly recover from the
fund for the cost of repairing the damage, but the person cannot. In
effect, at least as to the superfund, it's all right to kill people, but not
trees .... Under the bill before us, the State may be fully reimbursed
from the fund for the cost of restoring new trees to its park. But what
about the little girl? We have given her no recourse from the fund. She
cannot recover the money it will take to give her proper medical care...
It is simply a failure of will on the part of the Congress to deal with what is
the most serious part of the problem-injuries to persons.
126 CONG. Rxc. S14,973 & S14,974 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980), reprinted in NEEDHAM
& MENEFEE, supra note 47, at 295 (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
Yet, the Senator recognized that traditional state tort actions provide a legal
cause of action against a party causing the injury. Id. See, e.g., In re Paoli RR. Yard
PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 715, 715 (3d Cir. 1994).
50. See S. REP. No. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in NEEDHAM &
MENEFEE, supra note 47, at 299. Section 4(c) (1) of S. REP. No. 1480 explains that
medical expenses are defined in § 4(a) (2) (F). Id. Section 4(a) (2) (F), in turn,
defines "medical expenses" as "all out-of-pocket medical expenses, including reha-
bilitation costs or burial expenses, due to personal injury." Id.
[Vol. VII: p. 81
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ing, but rather out-of-pocket medical expenses resulting from per-
sonal injury.51
D. Promulgation and Purpose of the ATSDR
CERCLA section 104(i) establishes the Agency for Toxic Sub-
stances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) within the Public Health Ser-
vice. 52 The ATSDR exists to study the effects of hazardous
substance exposure on human health.53 Specifically, the ATSDR
was created to: 1) establish and maintain both a national registry of
persons exposed to toxic substances and a national registry of seri-
ous diseases;54 2) establish and maintain an inventory of literature
on the health effects of toxic substances; 55 3) compile a list of areas
restricted or closed due to toxic substance contamination;56 4) pro-
vide medical care to those exposed or believed to be exposed to
toxic substances in cases of public health emergencies;5 7 and 5)
"conduct periodic survey and screening programs to determine re-
lationships between exposure to toxic substances and illness."58
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA) 59 expanded the ATSDR's function to encompass studies
concerning the impact of toxic substances on human health. 60 The
ATSDR is now responsible for compiling "health assessments" 61 for
51. See, e.g., Kanner, supra note 1, at 13 (concluding CERCLA, as passed into
law, excluded personal injury-related medical expenses but included medical mon-
itoring as response costs).
52. CERCLA § 104(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 & 300f-300j-
26 (establishing Public Health Service).
53. Dan A. Tanenbaum, Comment, When Does Going to the Doctor Serve the Public
Health? Medical Monitoring Response Costs Under CERCLA, 59 U. CHi. L. REV. 925, 935
(1992) (arguing that ATSDR should not preclude private monitoring programs,
but serve as model).
54. CERCLA § 104(i) (1) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (1) (A).
55. CERCLA § 104(i) (1) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(1)(B).
56. CERCIA § 104(i) (1) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(1)(C).
57. CERCLA § 104(i) (1) (D), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(1)(D). The measures to be
taken include, but are not "limited to, tissue sampling, chromosomal testing ... ,
epidemiological studies, or any other assistance appropriate under the circum-
stances." Id.
58. CERCLA § 104(i) (1) (E), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (1) (E). "In cases of public
health emergencies, exposed persons shall be eligible for admission to hospitals
and other facilities and services operated or provided by the Public Health Ser-
vice." Id.
59. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub.
L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
60. Tanenbaum, supra note 53, at 935 (citing CERCLA § 104(i) (6), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(i) (6)). The ATSDR now has specific procedures that it must follow ranging
from general research to detailed analysis. Id.
61. The term "health assessments" for purposes of this subsection includes:
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each facility listed on the National Priorities List (NPL),62 as well as
for facilities where the ATSDR receives information that individuals
have been exposed to hazardous substances as a result of a re-
lease. 63 The health assessments are then used to assist in determin-
ing whether to establish a "health surveillance program" for the
area in question. 64 In situations where the ATSDR determines that
a health surveillance program would be advantageous, 65 the pro-
gram shall include, but shall not be limited to, periodic medical
screening for diseases for which the population is at significant
risk,68 and a treatment mechanism for those people who are
screened and test positive for such disease. 67
The ATSDR, however, is restricted by the scope of its charter.68
As a result, the ATSDR may act only where the area in question is
preliminary assessments of the potential risk to human health posed by
individual sites and facilities, based on such factors as the nature and ex-
tent of contamination, the existence of potential pathways of human ex-
posure (including ground or surface water contamination, air emissions,
and food chain contamination), the size and potential susceptibility of
the community within the likely pathways of exposure, the comparison of
expected human exposure levels to the short-term and long-term health
effects associated with identified hazardous substances and any available
recommended exposure or tolerance limits for such hazardous sub-
stances, and the comparison of existing morbidity and mortality data on
diseases that may be associated with the observed levels of exposure....
CERCLA § 104(i) (6) (F), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (6) (F).
62. CERCLA § 104(i)(6)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(A). The National Priori-
ties List (NPL), established under CERCLA § 105, is a method for ranking and
identifying sites of all known and threatened releases throughout the United
States. CERCLA § 105(a) (8) (A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (8) (A)-(B). This list is to
be updated on an annual basis. CERCLA §105(a)(8)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605 (a) (8) (B). Listings are based upon the "relative risk or danger to public
health or welfare or the environment .... taking into account to the extent possi-
ble the population at risk, the hazard potential of the hazardous substances at such
facilities, the potential for contamination of drinking water supplies .... CER-
CIA § 105(a) (8) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (8) (A).
63. CERCLA § 104(i) (6) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(B). If the ATSDR opts
not to conduct a health assessment, the Administrator of ATSDR shall provide a
written explanation as to why an assessment is not appropriate. Id.
64. CERCLA § 104(i)(6)(G), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(G). The health assess-
ments are also used to determine whether an epidemiological study or implemen-
tation of a registry is needed instead of, or in addition to, the health surveillance
program. Id.
65. A health surveillance program is deemed advantageous when the "Admin-
istrator of ATSDR has determined that there is a significant increased risk of ad-
verse health effects in humans from exposure to hazardous substances based on
the results of a health assessment" or related measures. CERCLA § 104(i) (9), 42
U.S.C. § 9604(i) (9).
66. CERCLA § 104(i) (9) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (9) (A).
67. CERCLA § 104(i) (9) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (9) (B).
68. CERCLA §§ 104(i)(1)-(6) & 105(a) (8) (A), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(i)(1)-(6) &
9605 (a) (8) (A). See Hand, supra note 17, at 372.
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listed on the NPL, a requirement making the ATSDR "essentially
helpless to deal with smaller or less flagrantly contaminated loca-
tions."69 Moreover, the short-term damage control nature of
ATSDR's power limits its ability to accomplish long-term remedial
measures. 70 As one commentator noted, "although treatment is ob-
viously necessary in cases of human exposure to toxic substances, it
is not the purpose of the ATSDR, an agency designed primarily for
information-gathering, to bear the responsibility for providing indi-
vidual health care."71
III. CASE LAW ANALYSIS
There is considerable conflict among the federal courts con-
cerning whether medical monitoring costs are "necessary costs of
response" as provided by CERCLA section 107(a) (4) (B).72 The fol-
lowing sections analyze the divergent approaches taken by the
courts.
A. District Courts Finding Medical Monitoring Costs
Recoverable as CERCLA Response Costs
In Jones v. Inmot Corp., the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio addressed a motion to dismiss a com-
plaint seeking recovery of medical monitoring costs under CER-
CLA.73 In Jones, the court concluded that, as a matter of law, the
plaintiffs were not precluded from recovering damages that met the
CERCLA definition of response costs, including those for medical
monitoring.74 The Jones court's analysis focused on the definition
69. Hand, supra note 17, at 372.
70. See CERCLA § 104(i)(7)-(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(7)-(9). Furthermore,
§ 104(c) (1) provides that any such short-term removal action is limited to
$2,000,000 or 12 months in duration unless the Administrator determines that
continuation of the removal action is consistent with any plans for long-term reme-
dial action. CERCLA § 104(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c) (1).
71. Hand, supra note 17, at 372-73. The ATSDR's primary purpose is not re-
lated to medical surveillance even though "the ATSDR may conduct medical sur-
veillance of unspecified duration as part of an assessment where it finds a
'significant increased risk of adverse health effects in humans'. Id. at 372
(quoting CERCLA § 104(i) (9), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (9)).
72. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. See Price, 39 F.3d at 1015 n.10.
73. Jones, 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984). See CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (B),
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B).
74. Jones, 584 F. Supp. at 1428-30. The court's discussion began with a statu-
tory analysis of CERCLA, by noting that "broad judicial interpretation" is given to
private parties' actions under § 107 to recover response costs from responsible
third parties. Id. at 1428 (citing City of Phila. v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp.
1135, 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1982)).
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of "response costs." 75 While cognizant that the phrase "response
costs" is not defined in the statute, the court found that the plain-
tiffs' allegations of incurred costs for medical testing and other
damages "appear to meet the definition of 'removal' expressed in
section 9601 (23).-176 Furthermore, the court found that " [t] he stat-
utory definitions of removal and remedial actions are broadly
drawn and appear to cover at least some of the elements of dam-
ages claimed by these plaintiffs." 77
Relying on Jones, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Tennessee in Adams v. Republic Steel Corp.,78 recognized med-
ical monitoring costs as recoverable under CERCLA. The Adams
court, however, took a much narrower position on the medical
monitoring costs issue than did the court in Jones. Specifically, the
Adams court held that " [t]hese costs must be part of a 'clean up' or
response to a hazardous waste problem,... and a private right of
action for damages only is not available under the Act."79 Neverthe-
less, the court found that the plaintiffs "alleged sufficient facts to
warrant a finding that a claim ha[d] been stated 'arising under'
CERCLA." 80 As a result, the court denied the defendants' motion
to dismiss the plaintiffs' CERCLA claim.8'
In Brewer v. Ravan,82 the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee approached the issue of medical mon-
75. Id. at 1428-29. "To survive the defendant's motion to dismiss . . . , the
damages enumerated must be 'necessary costs of response' and 'consistent with
the national contingency plan.'" Id. at 1429 (citing CERCIA § 107(a) (4) (B), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B)).
76. Id. at 1429. The court asserted that "lilt would be premature for this
Court to attempt to decide whether plaintiffs are entitled to recover any damages
that would meet the CERCLA definition of response costs .... [H]owever, we
cannot say as a matter of law that the plaintiffs are not so entitled." Id. at 1430.
For a discussion of "removal," see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
77. Jones, 584 F. Supp. at 1430. For definitions of "removal" and "remedial
action," see supra notes 25 & 26, respectively, and accompanying text.
78. 621 F. Supp. 370, 376 (D. Tenn. 1985) (citingJnes, 584 F. Supp. at 1429).
79. Id. (citing City of Phila. v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1146
(E.D. Pa. 1982)). The court also cited previous comments regarding CERCIA
made by former Senator Albert Gore, Jr., as member of the House Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee: "A clear, uniform federal law defining a victim's
cause of action [for damages arising from release of hazardous wastes] is sorely
needed but [this] bill does not provide one." Id. at n.2 (quoting ADDIONAL. VIEWS
FOR "SUPERFUND" REPORT, Albert Gore, Jr., reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6139,
6141).
80. Adams, 621 F. Supp. at 377. The court noted, "[t]o the extent that plain-
tiffs may have suffered actual injury that may be remedied by an award of response
costs, it cannot be said that their claim is immaterial or wholly insubstantial." Id.
81. Id. at 377.
82. 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
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itoring costs in a slightly different manner. The court determined
that medical expenses related to treatment differ from those in-
curred in evaluating health risks.8 3 The court began its analysis by
acknowledging that earlier cases had found "considerable diffi-
culty" in applying section 107(a) due to CERCLA's failure to define
the term "necessary costs of response."8 4 The Brewer court then
noted that "CERCLA's legislative history clearly indicates that medi-
cal expenses incurred in the treatment of personal injuries or dis-
ease caused by an unlawful release or discharge of hazardous
substances are not recoverable under section 9607(a)."8 5 Neverthe-
less', the court took the position that medical surveillance aimed at
assessing public health risks should be recoverable under CER-
CLA.8 6 The court found that "[p]ublic health related medical tests
and screening clearly are necessary to 'monitor, assess, [or] evalu-
ate a release' and, therefore, constitute 'removal' under section
9601 (23)."87 In effect, the court distinguished medical expenses as-
sociated with treatment of disease from expenses incurred in evalu-
ation of health risks. 88 Ultimately, the Brewer court held the
plaintiffs' claim for CERCLA response costs should not be
dismissed. 89
83. Id. at 1179. The plaintiffs in Brewer alleged, inter alia, that they "have been
or may be forced to perform . . . soil testing, water monitoring, and medical
screening." Id. (citing Plaintiffs' Complaint at 14).
84. Id. (citingJones, 584 F. Supp. at 1429-30).
The court also referred to several cases that found "necessary costs of re-
sponse" included on-site testing and investigative costs. Id. See Wickland Oil Ter-
minals v. ASARCO, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 1986); City of New York v.
Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Velsicol Chem. Corp. v.
Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2118, 2121-22 (E.D. Tenn.
1984).
85. Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607; Chap-
lin v. Exxon Co., No. CIVA.H-84-2524, 1986 WL 13130, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 10,
1986) (discussing CERCLA legislative history); Artesian Water Co. v. Government
of New Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348, 1356 n.10 (D. Del. 1985).
86. Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179. "To the extent that plaintiffs seek to recover
the cost of medical testing and screening conducted to assess the effect of the release or
discharge on public health or to identify potential public health problems presented by the
release, however, they present a cognizable claim under section 9607(a)." Id. (em-
phasis in original). See Jones, 584 F. Supp. at 1429-30; Adams, 621 F. Supp. at 376;
see also Velsicol 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2121 (finding it is "difficult to see how
costs of identifying and determining how to allay the environmental problem
presented" are not recoverable response costs under § 107(a)).
87. Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179. According to the court, "[b]ecause the term
'response' is defined in section 9601(25) to mean, in part, 'remove or removal,'
costs incurred as a result of conducting such tests and screening are recoverable
response costs under section 9607(a)." Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1180. In support of its ruling, the court stated that though "it is
unclear whether the medical tests and screening allegedly conducted by plaintiffs
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky supported the view that medical monitoring costs are re-
coverable in Lykins v. Westinghouse Electric.90 In Lykins, the defend-
ants argued that plaintiffs' claims for medical expenses and
relocation costs were not recoverable as "response costs." 91 The
court, however, determined that section 107(a) (4) (B) of CERCLA
authorizes a party to recover costs incurred for medical testing and
for loss of the use of wells that provided drinking water.92 The
court qualified its finding by requiring that the costs "be part of a
'clean up' or response to a hazardous waste problem" and not
merely a private cause of action for damages. 93 Based on this rea-
soning, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs' CERCLA claims.94
In Williams v. Allied Automotive, Autolite Division,95 the defend-
ants unsuccessfully sought summary judgment against the plaintiffs'
claims for future medical monitoring costs under CERCLA. 96 The
Williams court determined that "[t]he statutory definition of the
were public health related, at this early stage of the proceedings, the Court cannot
say that it appears beyond doubt that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support
of their CERCLA claim." Id.
90. No. CIVA.85-508, 1988 WL 114522 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 29, 1988).
91. Id. at *3. Under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B), a party may recover response
costs as long as they are correlative with a "clean up" or a "response to a hazardous
waste problem." Id.
92. Id. See CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B).
93. Lykins, No. CIVA.85-508, 1988 WL 114522, at *3 (citing Adams, 621 F.
Supp. at 370). The court recognized that an inconclusive list of response costs are
recoverable under CERCIA. This list included relocation costs; "litigation costs;
monitoring; assessing and evaluating expenses; future response costs consistent
with the NCP; investigation costs; property damage; and supervision costs." Id. at
*4 (citations omitted).
94. Id. at *4. The court concluded that "[iut would be premature for this
Court to attempt to decide whether plaintiffs are entitled to recover any damages
that would meet the CERCLA definition of response costs. In light of the present
procedural posture of the case, however, it cannot say, as a matter of law, that the
plaintiffs are not so entitled." Id.
95. 704 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1988).
96. Id. at 787. The court listed the prima facie elements for the plaintiffs'
claim for recovering costs under CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (B):
1) defendants must fall within one of the four categories of covered
persons;
2) there must have been a release or a threatened release;
3) the release or threatened release has caused plaintiffs to incur costs;
4) plaintiffs' costs must be necessary costs of response; and
5) plaintiffs' response action must be consistent with the National Con-
tingency Plan.
Id. at 784 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B)).
The court further explained that plaintiffs could recover the costs of" 'such
actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release .... or the
taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate
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terms 'remove' or 'removal' clearly contemplates such actions as
are necessary to making a reasoned determination whether physical
removal of hazardous contaminants is necessary in a given situa-
tion."97 The court further recognized that medical testing costs
consistent with the NCP are recoverable response costs under CER-
CLA.9s According to the court, "[i] n the absence of any controlling
authority on the issue, this Court is of the opinion that costs of fu-
ture medical monitoring are not categorically unrecoverable as re-
sponse costs under CERCLA, provided that plaintiffs meet their
burden of proving that such costs are necessary and consistent with
the NCP."99 As a result, the court denied the defendants' motions
for summary judgment regarding medical monitoring costs under
CERCLA. 100
B. District Courts Finding Medical Monitoring Costs Not
Recoverable as CERCLA Response Costs
When confronted with the issue, a number of federal district
courts have concluded that medical monitoring costs are not "nec-
essary costs of response" as provided within CERCLA section
107(a) (4)(B). 101 In Chaplin v. Exxon Co., 10 2 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Texas held that medical de-
damage to the public health or welfare .... which may otherwise result from a
release.'" Id. (quoting CERCLA § 101 (23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)).
97. Williams, 704 F. Supp. at 784. See United States v. Conservation Chem.
Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 406 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (holding costs of activities useful and
necessary for implementing proposed remedy are conceivably recoverable as re-
sponse costs), order modified, 681 F. Supp. 1394 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
98. Williams, 704 F. Supp. at 784. According to the court, "[c]osts of medical
testing falling within the statutory definition and consistent within the National
Contingency Plan (NCP) are recoverable response costs under CERCLA." Id. (cit-
ing Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179) (holding medical monitoring targeted at public
health risks should be recoverable under CERCLA).
99. Id.
100. Id. Although the court considered future medical monitoring costs re-
coverable under CERCLA, it made the following observation: "[while] liability for
future costs can presently be determined and declaratory relief granted, the Court
cannot award costs until they are incurred." Id. (citations omitted).
101. See, e.g., Frys v. General Motors Corp., No. 93-CV-924A, 1995 WL 322585
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1995); Woodman v. United States, 764 F. Supp. 1467 (M.D. Fla.
1991); Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated in part,
793 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992); Coburn, No. CIVA.88-0120, 1988 WL 120739;
Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 681 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
102. No. CIVA.H-84-2524, 1986 WL 13130 (S.D. Tex. June 10, 1986). The
Chaplin court was one of the first courts to address the issue of whether medical
monitoring costs qualify as "necessary response costs." Id. at *1. In Chaplin, the
numerous defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1)
& (6), claiming that medical monitoring costs were not "necessary response costs"
as covered by CERCIA § 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B). Id.
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tection and monitoring costs are not "recoverable costs" as
contemplated by Congress when it enacted CERCLA.103 The Chap-
lin court, after noting the ambiguity of section 107,104 found that
the legislative history, albeit sparse, indicated "the specific omission
of such private rights from the final version [of the Act at the time
of its passage] ,"105 Particular emphasis was placed on the remarks
of Senator Randolph, co-author of the compromise bill, who stated
"[w] e have deleted the federal cause of action for medical expenses
or property or income loss."106
Next, the court determined that the plain meaning of the
phrase "necessary costs of response," as used in section
107(a) (4) (B), does not encompass medical monitoring.107 In
reaching this conclusion, the court found that CERCLA requires
"an actual past outlay of expenses for cleanup" before an action can
be properly brought under this section.'08 In the court's view, the
prospective nature of medical monitoring costs thereby render
them incompatible with section 107(a) (4) (B). 109
An action for medical monitoring costs under CERCLA section
107(a) (4) (B) was subsequently denied by the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Coburn v. Sun
103. Id. at *2. Similarly, in Wehner, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California held that medical monitoring costs incurred for
personal health reasons are not recoverable under CERCLA. 681 F. Supp. at 651.
The Wehner court found that while Congress originally considered including medi-
cal monitoring costs under CERCLA, the bill was passed without such a provision.
Id. at 653.
104. Chaplin, No. CIVA.H-84-2524, 1986 WL 13130, at *1. The court attrib-
uted the ambiguity of § 107 to the "haste with which Congress drafted and adopted
the final version of the statute." Id. The court also found that "[p]laintiffs by
seeking medical detection and monitoring costs present a unique cause of action
under CERCLA and to date there is no apparent precedent directly in [sic] point."
Id. at *2.
105. Id. The court recognized that earlier bills in both the House and Senate
contained provisions allowing for medical monitoring as a "necessary cost of re-
sponse," but that those provisions had been eliminated from § 107 as adopted. Id.
See S. REP. No. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a)(2)(F) (draft of July 11, 1979);
H.R. REP. No. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3071(b) (draft of Apr. 2, 1980).
106. Chaplin, No. CIVA.H-84-2524, 1986 WL 13130, at *2 (quoting 126 CONG.
Rc. S14,964 (1980) (statement of Senator Randolph)). For a discussion of CER-
CIA's legislative history, see supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
107. Id. at *7.
108. Id. at *3. The court found that the plaintiffs could not seek damages
unless they "affirmatively demonstrate[d] that [they] incurred necessary costs of
response." Id. But seeJones, 584 F. Supp. at 1430 (holding when some response
costs are incurred under CERCLA courts can determine liability for future costs).
109. Chaplin, No. CIV.A.H-84-2524, 1986 WL 13130, at *3-4. The court dis-
missed the plaintiff's action pursuant to FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(1) & (6). Id.
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Chemical Corp.110 Unlike the court in Chaplin, the Coburn court be-
gan its analysis by interpreting the plain language of section
107(a) (4) (B).111 After establishing that the phrase "necessary costs
of response" is not defined in CERCLA and that the term "re-
sponse" is "defined in a most indirect and ambiguous manner," the
court directed its attention to CERCLA's legislative history.112 The
court opined that "[tihe legislative history of CERCLA offers little
guidance into the definition of 'necessary costs of response,' "113
since "the compromise bill which became CERCLA differed mark-
edly from the original Senate Superfund Bill."114
Recognizing the absence of federal appellate court precedent
and that federal district courts are divided on the issue, the Coburn
court analyzed the two leading cases that had found -medical moni-
110. No. CIVA.88-0120, 1988 WL 120739 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1988). See also
Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468, 1474 (D. Colo. 1991) ("The
Coburn line of cases is persuasive authority that the costs of medical testing to mon-
itor the health effects of a release or threatened release are not recoverable under
section 9607(a)."); Woodman v. United States, 764 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (relying exclusively on decision in Coburn to find that medical monitoring
expenses are not CERCLA response costs); Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F.
Supp. 692, 714 (D. Kan. 1991); Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1246
(M.D. Pa. 1990) (holding Coburn court's in-depth analysis leads to belief that medi-
cal monitoring costs are not necessary response costs under § 107); States v. BFG
Electroplating & Mfg. Co., No. CIV.A.87-1421, 1990 WL 67978, at *2 (W.D. Pa.
Apr. 6, 1990) (adopting rationale and conclusion reached in Coburn); Lutz v. Chro-
matex, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 413, 418 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (holding Coburn conclusion
correct).
111. Coburn, No. CIVA.88-0120, 1988 WL 120739, at *2. The court recog-
nized that "[i]t is well settled that 'the starting point for interpreting a statute is the
language of the statute itself.' " Id. (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 107, 108 (1980)).
112. Id. In its analysis, the court relies on 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) and (24) for
definitions of "remove" and "remedy". Id. For a further discussion of the terms
"remove," "removal," "remedy," and "remedial action," see supra notes 25, 26 and
accompanying text.
113. Coburn, No. CIVA.88-0120, 1988 WL 120739, at *3. The court noted
that
[t] he circuitous language of CERCILA reflects the statute's checkered leg-
islative formulation. After a number of predecessor bills failed to muster
sufficient support, a group of senators submitted the Stafford-Randolph
compromise bill to a lame duck Congress in the waning days of the
Carter Administration. That bill, however, did not receive careful study
by a committee, and voting on the floor was controlled by a procedure
that permitted no amendments, other than one previously cleared. The
legislative history, therefore, furnishes at best a sparse and unreliable
guide to the statute's meaning.
Id. (quoting Artesian Water, 851 F.2d at 648).
114. Id. This court, as in Chaplin, placed great emphasis on the remarks of
Senator Randolph concerning the issue of medical monitoring costs. Id. See BFG,
No. CIVA.87-1421, 1990 WL 67978, at *3. For a discussion of the Senator's state-
ments, see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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toring costs recoverable under section 107(a) (4) (B). 115 The court
stated that Jones, "did not actually address the issue of whether costs
of medical detection and monitoring are 'necessary costs of re-
sponse' under CERCLA."1 1 6 The court then examined the second
case, Brewer, in greater detail. The Coburn court explained that
Brewer distinguished medical expenses incurred in the treatment of
personal injuries from expenses incurred as a result of medical test-
ing or screening, where only the latter is included as a "necessary
cost of response. "1 17
The Coburn court, however, disagreed with the result reached
in Brewer and held that the "costs of medical screening and/or fu-
ture medical monitoring are clearly not 'necessary costs of re-
sponse' under section 107 of CERCLA."1 18 The court determined
that the statutory definitions of the words "response," "remove," "re-
moval," "remedy," and "remedial action" do not contain any refer-
ence to medical monitoring costs nor their recoverability under
section 107(a) (4) (A). 119 The court also cited CERCLA's legislative
history as support for its conclusion. 120 Accordingly, the court
115. Coburn, No. CIVA.88-0120, 1988 WL 120739, at *3-5. See BFG, No.
CIVA.87-1421, 1990 WL 67978, at *2 (adopting court's analysis and conclusion
stated in Coburn).
116. Coburn, No. CLV.A.88-0120, 1988 WL 120739, at *4. In Jones, the court
recognized that "few courts have faced the issue of what items of damages are
response costs recoverable under CERCLA." 584 F. Supp. at 1429. For a discus-
sion of Jones, see supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
117. Coburn, No. C1VA.88-0120, 1988 WL 120739, at *4. See also Cook v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468 (D.Colo. 1991). In Cook, the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado held that medical monitoring costs were
not recoverable. The Cook court, however, also concluded that because "CERCLA
was designed to facilitate the cleanup of toxic substances from the environment...
[i]f plaintiffs can show that medical testing is necessary to monitor the environ-
mental effects of a 'release' or 'threatened release,' the costs of such medical test-
ing plainly fall within the purview of section 9601(25)." Id. at 1474. See also
Woodman, 764 F. Supp. at 1469-70 (holding Brewer does not equate all medical
monitoring costs with CERCLA response costs).
118. Coburn, No. CIVA.88-0120, 1988 WL 120739, at *5. The court did recog-
nize that other district courts have followed the ruling of Brewer. Id. at *4. See, e.g.,
Lykins, No. CIVA.85-508, 1988 WL 114522 (following the Brewer rationale that
"plaintiffs' costs of medical screening and/or possible future medical monitoring
comprise recoverable response costs under CERCLA"); Williams v. Allied Automo-
tive, Autolite Division, 704 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1988) (holding costs of future
medical monitoring may be recovered under CERCLA).
119. Williams, 704 F. Supp. at 782.
120. Coburn, No. C1VA.88-0120, 1988 WL 120739, at *5. Not only does the
congressional record support this reading of the legislative history, the Supreme
Court, "after reviewing this legislative history, observed that CERCIA was not in-
tended to compensate private parties for damages resulting from hazardous sub-
stance discharge." Id. For further discussion of CERCIA's legislative history, see
supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
[Vol. VII: p. 81
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found "cases which have denied motions to dismiss claims for medi-
cal detection and monitoring costs... unpersuasive."' 121
C. Circuit Courts of Appeals Finding Medical Monitoring Costs
Not Recoverable as CERCLA Response Costs
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the recovery of
medical monitoring costs under section 107(a) (4) (B) in Daigle v.
Shell Oil Co.122 In an analysis similar to that of the district court in
Coburn, the Daigle court began with the language of CERCLA sec-
tion 107(a) (4) (B) and its corresponding definitions. 123 After deter-
mining that "certain monitoring costs are recoverable as 'removal
action' or 'remedial action' 'response costs[,]' ... [the court found
that] the Brewer court [went] awry in affording a broad sweep to the
'public health and welfare' language in the definitions."' 24 The
Tenth Circuit then concluded that CERCLA's legislative history
pointed toward denial of recovery for medical monitoring costs. 125
121. Id. The court noted that "[t] he Jones court never actually addressed the
issue of whether costs of medical detection and monitoring are 'necessary costs of
response'. . . [but,] [i]t merely stated that '[t]he statutory definitions of removal
and remedial actions are broadly drawn and appear to cover at least some of the
elements of damages claimed by these plaintiffs." Id. (quotingJones, 584 F. Supp.
at 1430). See Werlein, 746 F. Supp. at 903.
The Coburn court also reiterated the Brewer court's discussion, but disagreed
with the Brewer court's conclusion that " '[p] ublic health related medical tests and
screening clearly are necessary to monitor, assess [or] evaluate a release.' " Coburn,
No. CIVA.88-0120, 1988 WL 120739, at *6 (quoting Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179).
The court concluded, "We find it difficult to understand how future medical test-
ing and monitoring of persons who were exposed to contaminated well water prior
to the remedial measures currently underway will do anything to 'monitor, assess
[or] evaluate a release' of contamination from the site. We, therefore, elect not to
follow the rationale of Brewer." Id. See Werlein, 746 F. Supp. at 903.
122. 972 F.2d 1527, 1537 (10th Cir. 1992). The Daigle case was "the first
Court of Appeals case to address the issue of whether medical monitoring costs are
recoverable by private plaintiffs as a necessary 'response' under CERCLA." Price v.
United States Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 1994).
123. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1533-36.
124. Id. at 1535. The court determined that in the context of the "monitor-
ing" and "health and welfare" language, "both definitions are directed at contain-
ing and cleaning up hazardous substance releases." Id. (citing CERCLA § 101 (23),
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)). Further, the "remedial action" definition focuses only on
actions necessary to prevent hazardous substances from contaminating the envi-
ronment. Id. (citing CERCLA § 101 (24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24)). In light of the
definitions and the specific examples of removal costs enumerated therein, the
court followed the statutory canon of construction which necessitates that all
things be of similar type. Id. Consequently, because medical monitoring costs are
unlike security fences and trenches, those expenses cannot be contained within
the provision. Id.
125. Id. at 1535-36. The court noted that "the history of the enactment of
CERCLA reveals that both houses of Congress considered and rejected any provi-
sion for recovery of private damages unrelated to the cleanup effort, including
1996]
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Finally, the Tenth Circuit held that because medical expenses are
explicitly provided for in section 104(i) (8) of CERCLA, 126 they nec-
essarily are not "response cost[s]" as contemplated in section
107(a) (4) (B).1 2 7
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
the issue of medical monitoring costs under section 107(a) (4) (B)
in Price v. United States Navy. 128 The court, relying exclusively on the
Tenth Circuit's analysis in Daigle, held that medical monitoring
costs are not "response costs" under CERCLA.129 Accordingly, the
plaintiff's claim for medical monitoring costs, supported by the
same arguments as those advanced by the plaintiffs in Daigle, was
rejected.1 30
The Ninth Circuit revisited the medical monitoring costs issue
in Durfey v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours Co.131 In Dufey, the plaintiffs
appealed the district court's decision dismissing their medical mon-
itoring claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1 3 2 Relying on
both its earlier decision in Price and the Tenth Circuit's holding in
medical expenses." Id. at 1535. The court also relied on the remarks of Senator
Randolph, co-sponsor of the compromise bill, who "expressly acknowledged the
intentional deletion of any private cause of action for personal injury." Id. at 1536.
Further, the court quoted Representative Gore who recognized "[t] he drastic whit-
ling down of the original liability provisions." Id. at 1536 n.7 (citing H.R. REP. No.
1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 62-65 (1980) reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CA.N.
6119, 6139-41).
126. CERCLA § 104(i) (8), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (8). The ATSDR is empowered
with a broad base of functions for dealing with the assessment of health effects of
actual and threatened hazardous substance releases. Daige, 972 F.2d at 1536. For
an explanation of the ATSDR section, see supra notes 52-71 and accompanying
text.
127. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1537. The court subsequently reversed the district
court's order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss. Id. See Frys, No. 93-CV-
924A, 1995 WL 322585; Woodman, 764 F. Supp. 1467 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Werlein, 746
F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990); Coburn, No. CIVA.88-0120, 1988 WL 120739;.
Wehner, 681 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
128. 39 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1994).
129. Id. at 1015-17 (citing Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1527). The court further
opined, "[p]laintiff's request for medical monitoring to allow 'prevention or early
detection of chronic disease' smacks of a cause of action for damages resulting
from personal injury." Id. (quoting Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535).
130. Id.
131. 59 F.3d 121 (9th Cir. 1995).
132. Id. at 123. Specifically, the district court held that until the ATSDR com-
pleted its investigation, any medical monitoring claim brought under CERCLA
would be a "premature challenge." Id. As a result, the district court "dismissed all
the medical monitoring claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
CERCLA section 113(h)." Id. (citing In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 780
F. Supp. 1551, 1564-65 (E.D. Wash. 1991)).
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Daigle, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its position that "medical moni-
toring costs are not 'response' costs under CERCLA."133
IV. IMPACT
The conflicting judicial interpretation of CERCLA section
107(a) (4) (B), highlights a tension between a legislative history
which explicitly rejects private recovery of medical monitoring
costs, and a compelling public policy aimed at holding polluters
accountable for the costs of environmental cleanup.13 4 In accord-
ance with the circuit courts' decisions in Daigle, Price, and Durfey,135
the current judicial trend is to deny recognition of medical moni-
toring as a "necessary cost of response." 136 To combat this develop-
ment, several legal commentators have actively sought to resuscitate
the recovery of medical monitoring costs under CERCLA section
107(a) (4) (B).1 37
A. Medical Monitoring Costs as Deterrent for Polluters
Those who view medical monitoring costs as response costs
under section 107(a) (4) (B) argue that allowing recovery serves
CERCLA's overriding purpose and deters potential environmental
polluters. In particular, supporters submit that allowing recovery
achieves CERCLA's overall purpose of compensating victims of en-
vironmental contamination while holding polluters liable for its
133. Durfey, 59 F.3d at 125.
134. "Although the legislative history indicates that private recovery under
CERCLA was specifically rejected by Congress, CERCLA's provisions do not forbid
recovery of medical costs. The legislative history of CERCLA indicates that Con-
gress intended to recover from polluters the costs incurred in cleanup." Czmus,
supra note 2, at 53 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CA.N. 6119-20).
135. To date, only the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have explicitly addressed the
issue of medical monitoring under § 107(a) (4) (B) of CERCLA.
136. This interpretation is further supported by the observation that the Wil-
liams court, in 1988, was the last district court to find future medical monitoring
expenditures recoverable as response costs under CERCIA. See Williams v. Allied
Automotive, Autolite Division, 704 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1988).
137. As one commentator has pointed out, public policy supports recognition
of claims to recover costs for post-exposure, pre-symptom medical surveillance.
Amy B. Blumenberg, Note, Medical Monitoring Funds: The Periodic Payment of Future
Medical Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 678-
82 (1992)., Blumenberg noted the public policy reasons commonly cited for hold-
ing toxic tortfeasors liable for medical monitoring costs, namely that such awards
provide services to those who would otherwise be unable to afford them, offer
information regarding health consequences, and the deterrence of future toxic
torts. Id. See also Gara, supra note 6, at 267-72 (arguing polluters should be held
liable for medical monitoring costs because this promotes goals of deterrence and
mitigation of harm to exposure victims).
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cleanup.' 38 These same proponents also contend that interpreting
medical monitoring costs as response costs under CERCLA acts as a
significant deterrent to polluters.' 3 9
Despite CERCLA's noble purpose and the allure of an effective
pollution deterrent provision, the aforementioned arguments falter
when viewed in light of the final draft's specific statutory language.
CERCLA's statutory language may not expressly forbid the recovery
of medical monitoring costs as "necessary costs of response;" Con-
gress, however, did not expressly provide for recovery of such
costs. 140 Specifically, unlike security fences and confinement
ditches, medical monitoring is not listed among the statutory exam-
ples of either "removal efforts" or "remedial actions." 141 In addi-
tion, CERCLA's establishment of the ATSDR, an agency explicitly
authorized to assess health effects associated with actual and
threatened hazardous substance releases, indicates that Congress
perceived medical monitoring costs and response costs as two dis-
tinct concepts.' 42 The legislative history of CERCLA, moreover, in-
dicates an intentional elimination of a provision for recovery of
138. Czmus, supra note 2, at 53. A commentator observed:
Although Congress may not have wished to provide all victims of toxic
exposures with a private remedy of medical monitoring, the availability of
such a remedy under CERCLA for exposures related to toxic cleanup is
not inconsistent with the purpose of CERCLA. In CERCLA, Congress
wished to create a remedy for allowing compensation for the costs of
cleanup that also force [sic] polluters to cleanup their pollution. Al-
lowing recovery of exposure such as that which occurred in Daigle is con-
sistent with the desire to require polluters to pay for the costs incurred in
cleanups.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119-20).
139. Blumenberg, supra note 137, at 681. "Once polluters were subject to
significant liability, they would be more willing to incur the expense of proper
disposal rather than the expense of protracted litigation and payment of medical
surveillance claims." Id.
140. For a discussion of the statutory language that pertains to "necessary cost
of response," see supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
141. For a discussion of the statutory examples of the terms "removal efforts"
and "remedial actions," see supra notes 25 & 26, respectively, and accompanying
text.
142. See Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1537. In its analysis, the court compares
§ 107(a) (4) (D) (health assessment costs) with § (4) (A) (response costs). Id. Ac-
cording to the court, "[t]hat Congress provided separate recovery and funding
provisions for health assessment costs indicates that such costs, including the medi-
cal monitoring Plaintiffs seek, differ from response costs, and "response costs" are
the only available costs to private parties under the s[sic] 107(a) (4) (D) liability
provision." Id. For a further discussion of the ATSDR, see supra notes 52-71 and
accompanying text.
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medical costs in order to ensure political passage of the bill. 143
Thus, notwithstanding CERCLA's overriding purpose and any po-
tential deterrent effect to polluters, the statutory language of CER-
CLA itself denies the recovery of medical monitoring costs as
response costs under section 107(a) (4) (B).
B. Insufficiency of Traditional Tort Remedies
A second argument in support of equating medical monitoring
costs with response costs urges that medical monitoring suits under
CERCLA offer an efficient means to address serious health issues
created by environmental pollution.'" Advocates of this position
believe traditional tort remedies cannot sufficienfly compensate vic-
tims of toxic exposure. 145 According to one commentator, "[s]ince
the latency of toxic exposure delays manifestations of any disease
for months or even years, . . . traditional tort principles inade-
quately address the issues in toxic tort litigation." 46 Due to long
latency periods, advocates contend that medical monitoring is inval-
uable to "toxic exposure victims [who] may fail to initiate an action
143. See Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535-36. Though the court recognized that the
legislative history of CERCLA is sparse, "the history of the enactment of CERCLA
reveals that both houses of Congress considered and rejected any provision for
recovery of private damages unrelated to the clean-up effort, including medical
expenses." Id. The court attached significant importance to Senator Randolph's
comment, "[w] e have deleted the Federal cause of action for medical expenses or
income loss," and treated this comment as a reliable indicator that Congress did
intend to exclude "medical expenses" from recovery. Id. For a further discussion
of CERCLA's legislative history, see supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
144. One author has cited what he considers "three good reasons to favor
recovery of medical monitoring costs." Tanenbaum, supra note 53, at 949. First,
"medical monitoring suits directly implicate health problems that may already be
dangerous and could be getting worse daily. There is an immediate danger in
these cases that must be met with vigorous responses." Id. Next, medical monitor-
ing may provide efficiency by saving time, resources, and money associated with
future medical costs. Id. Lastly, "CERCLA is the result of a congressional policy
choice to make cleanup of hazardous wastes the priority." Id. at 950.
145. One commentator has explained the problem in this manner:
The common law tort system was developed to address conflicts raised by
simple, straightforward traumatic injuries.... Toxic tort injuries, how-
ever, may remain undetected for years because cancer and other expo-
sure-related diseases have long latency periods, during which time the
ailment cannot be clinically diagnosed. Because of the long latency peri-
ods, toxic exposure victims may fail to initiate an action because they do
not know that they have been harmed by a toxic substance.
Blumenberg, supra note 137, at 668 (footnote omitted).
146. Czmus, supra note 2, at 35 (citing D. Alan Rudlin & Michael R. Shebel-
skie, Novel Toxic Tort Claims and Insurance Coverage in 495 PLI/COMM 243, 251
(1989)).
1996]
23
LaRatta and Paszamant: Diagnosing Medical Monitoring Costs under CERCLA: Checking for a
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
104 VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII: p. 81
because they do not know that they have been harmed by a toxic
substance." 147
While a cause of action based on exposure to toxic substances
may not have been anticipated by traditional tort theories, the com-
mon law may adapt to accommodate such a problem. 148 In fact,
common law remedies that award medical monitoring costs to toxic
exposure victims presently exist and continue to evolve in most
states. 149 Indeed, state courts have begun to allow claimants in
toxic exposure cases to collect future medical monitoring costs as a
component of plaintiff awards.1 50 Thus, it is appropriate to seek
reimbursement for medical monitoring costs under state common
law rather than under CERCLA section 107(a) (4) (B).
C. Innocent Plaintiff Rationale
Commentators further cite a policy rationale for authorizing
the recovery of medical monitoring costs under CERCLA. They ar-
gue that innocent plaintiffs may be unable to afford the costs associ-
ated with medical monitoring. 151 Under this rationale, corporate
defendants are in better financial positions to bear the costs of
147. Blumenberg, supra note 137, at 668. The author notes that due to this
long latency period, the illness may not be detected until the applicable statute of
limitation has run, thereby precluding the plaintiff from recovery. Id. at 669.
Many jurisdictions, though, have adopted a theory where the statute of limitations
begins to toll when the illness is discovered, rather than when it is contracted. Id.
(citing Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 300 (NJ. 1987)).
148. Czmus, supra note 2, at 36. Thejudicial system has developed alternative
theories of liability due to the inherent difficulty in proving toxic torts. Id. These
alternatives include recovery for increased risk of contracting future medical
problems, fear of future illnesses, as well as medical monitoring. Id. (citing Rudlin,
supra note 146, at 251). See also Ayers, 525 A.2d at 299 (outlining requirements for
expert testimony in medical monitoring cases).
149. Czmus, supra note 2, at 36 (citing Kanner, supra note 3, at 739). Due to
these evolving theories of liability, plaintiffs can now recover damages that are dif-
ferent in nature from traditional tort awards. Id. As Czmus points out, "[d] amages
for increased risk or for medical monitoring may be considered either an equita-
ble remedy for exposure to a toxic substance or, alternatively, a form of damages."
Id. (citing Kanner, supra note 3, at 739-40).
150. In fact, "[w]hen requesting damages for medical monitoring, the plain-
tiff need not demonstrate any current harm, but rather must show that medical
monitoring is recommended to detect the early onset of a medical illness resulting
from the toxic exposure." Czmus, supra note 2, at 36 (citing Kanner, supra note 3,
at 740). "Moreover, the plaintiff does not even have to demonstrate that future
illness is likely to occur." Id.
151. Czmus, supra note 2, at 36-37. "As a public policy consideration, in con-
trast to the plaintiff's financial inability to bear the costs of medical monitoring,
the corporate defendant may be in a better position to undertake the burden of
such testing." Id. (citing Kathleen A. O'Nan, The Challenge of Latent Physical Effects
of Toxic Substances: The Next Step in the Evolution of Toxic Torts, 7 J. MIN. L. & POL'Y
227, 228 (1991-92)).
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medical surveillance than individuals exposed to toxic
substances. 152
Initially, this policy argument appears reasonable when assess-
ing financial liability between corporate defendants and innocent
plaintiffs. As previously stated, however, CERCLA's legislative his-
tory and statutory language prohibit such a construction while state
tort remedies address this problem. Moreover, allowing additional
suits under CERCLA could create an abundance of medical moni-
toring litigation, leading to unanticipated consequences such as pa-
ralysis of industry and business. Furthermore, rather than reducing
toxic exposure, such suits could deter technological innovation. 153
D. Distinction Between Medical Treatment Expenses and
Medical Surveillance Costs
Finally, some writers have cleverly argued for the recovery of
medical monitoring costs by drawing a distinction between medical
treatment expenses and medical surveillance costs. According to
Dan A. Tanenbaum, the conflict among the courts is rooted in the
initial judicial characterization of the claims. 154 As Tanenbaum has
argued, "[m] edical monitoring costs must be distinguished from di-
rect medical treatment costs."155
Tanenbaum has developed a three-part test to evaluate claims
brought by private litigants seeking to recover medical monitoring
response costs.1 56 First, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a system
152. Id. at 37 (citing O'Nan, supra note 151, at 228).
153. See id. at 54. According to Czmus, "in any incident carrying the risk of
such exposure, the responsible party would be liable for medical monitoring for
the remainder of any victim's lifespan." Id.
154. Tanenbaum, supra note 53, at 939-40.
Some courts characterize the plaintiffs' claims not as investigatory re-
sponse cost actions, but as suits to recover medical damages. These
courts reject monitoring costs as a matter of course. The courts that are
more receptive to allowing recovery of medical monitoring costs distin-
guish monitoring from treatment, and maintain that medical monitoring
may be a viable investigatory cost under CERCLA.
Id.
155. Id. at 929 (emphasis in original). A determination of whether or not
medical monitoring costs are recoverable largely depends on the initial classifica-
tion of those costs. Under an appropriate classification scheme, recoverable re-
sponse costs "would include medical monitoring costs expended to determine the
extent of environmental harms, but would not include expenditures for treating
individuals for illnesses caused by those harms." Id. at 927.
156. Id. at 951. Tanenbaum recognizes the possibility that "if medical moni-
toring expenses are awarded with regularity, parties will begin to sue for monitor-
ing costs as a 'back door' method of recovering medical treatment costs under
CERCLA." Id. at 943. Nevertheless, he feels that an argument refusing to award
costs based on this potential for abuse is "easily countered." Id. He reasons that
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of testing has already been established or can be immediately im-
plemented.1 57 Next, a plaintiff must show that "the testing proce-
dures are tailored to determine the effects of substances that are
known or suspected to be present at the particular site." 58 Finally,
a plaintiff must demonstrate "that it is the entire community
(around the site) that is being tested, not just the named plain-
tiffs."' 59 In Tanenbaum's view, satisfaction of these three criteria
should enable a court to find that the incurred costs are consistent
with CERCLA's definition of "removal" thereby making these costs
recoverable. 160
Despite the attractiveness of Tanenbaum's argument, any dis-
tinction between medical treatment expenses and medical monitor-
ing costs is little more than an exercise in word-play. Since 1988, all
federal courts have found this distinction unpersuasive.' 61 Further-
more, judicial implementation of such a classification scheme
would only add to what the Daigle court referred to as CERCLA's
"notorious lack of clarity."162 Consequently, while Tanenbaum's ar-
guments, and those set forth by other commentators in favor of
recovering medical monitoring costs under CERCLA's response
cost provision are thoughtful, they are not persuasive.
V. CONCLUSION
The injuries that result from toxic exposure which medical
monitoring attempts to minimize are truly unfortunate. The reality
that innocent victims suffer disease is disturbing. A common reac-
not only would this challenge the validity of any award of investigatory costs but
also that abuse is better controlled by closer judicial scrutiny, not limited recov-
eries. Id.
157. Id. at 951.
158. Id. This requirement would entail documentation of the specific sub-
stances at issue and the scientific design of the intended study. Id.
159. Tanenbaum, supra note 53, at 951. According to Tanenbaum, "[tihis
last burden protects against charges that only the plaintiffs are profiting from the
enterprise." Id.
160. Id. "Once these three burdens are met, the court should determine that
the costs of response will enable parties to 'monitor, assess, and evaluate [a] re-
lease or threat of release,' and are therefore recoverable." Id. (quoting definition
of "removal" in CERCLA § 101 (23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)).
161. See Williams v. Allied Automotive, Autolite Division, 704 F. Supp. 782
(N.D. Ohio 1988).
162. Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1533 (10th Cir. 1992). See Colin
Crawford, Strategies for EnvironmentalJustice: Rethinking CERCLA Medical Monitoring
Lawsuits, 74 B.U. L. REv. 267, 276-77 (1994) ("[D]uring a period of economic
uncertainty, critics are likely to greet the suggestion that courts employ yet another
tool for assessing liability with extreme skittishness, especially because CERCIA is
notorious for its poor draftsmanship and the runaway costs associated with its im-
perfect enforcement.").
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tion is to point the finger at those responsible for the pollution and
seek to recover damages from these parties. The authors of this
Comment recognize this natural inclination, as well as the persua-
sive arguments proffered by both sides in the medical monitoring
debate.
In a utopian society, there would be no environmental hazards
or toxic torts. In a slightly less than perfect world, polluters would
be held liable for all costs associated with their contamination. Un-
fortunately, a flawed statute, CERCLA, governs this area of law. In
the absence of an overhaul of this legislation, its terms and its limi-
tations prevail.
As Daigle, Price, and Durfey, have held, CERCLA, in its current
form, does not authorize the private recovery of medical monitor-
ing costs. While state tort actions are not a panacea for disease re-
sulting from toxic exposure, such actions remain the best vehicles
for reaching the road to recovery of medical monitoring costs.
Medical monitoring costs under section 107(a) (4) (B) of CERCLA,
on the other hand, still suffer from the terminal condition pro-
nounced by the Daigle court. The Ninth Circuit provided environ-
mentalists with a second opinion in Price and Durfey, and the
prognosis remains grim: medical monitoring costs should not be
recoverable as necessary costs of response under CERCLA.
Anthony R LaRatta
Brian S. Paszamant
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